In the case Wallentin-Hermann v Alitalia—Linee Aeree Italiane SpA (Case C-549/07) of 22 December 2008,[2] the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg ruled on the interpretation of Article 5 of the regulation relating to cancellations, specifically paragraph 3 which states:
An operating air carrier shall not be obliged to pay compensation in accordance with Article 7, if it can prove that the cancellation is caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken.
The Court agreed with Wallentin-Hermann that any technical issues during aircraft maintenance don’t constitute "extraordinary circumstances" that would allow airlines to avoid paying passengers compensation for canceled flights. This case therefore closed the loophole which had allowed the airlines to abuse passengers by frivolous interpretation of "technical or extraordinary circumstances"; it further defined the phrase and limited its exploitation. The definition of "technical and/or extraordinary circumstances" by the Court now stands firm and solid: any carrier must prove that the alleged mechanical problem leading to the cancellation was "beyond its actual control", the court affirmed in a statement. In its judgment, the Fourth Chamber of the Court of Justice held:
Extraordinary circumstances” was not defined in the 2004 Regulation, but the phrase was to be interpreted narrowly since article 5(3) constituted a derogation from the principle, indicated in recitals 1 and 2 of the preamble, of protection of consumers, in as much as cancellation of flights caused serious inconvenience to passengers.
Furthermore, in the joined cases of Sturgeon v Condor, and Bock v Air France (C-402/07 and C-432/07),[3] the Fourth Chamber of the European Court of Justice held on 19 November 2009 that despite no express provision in the Regulation to compensate passengers for delay, passengers are now entitled to the compensation as set out in Article 8 for any delay in excess of three hours providing the air carrier cannot raise a defence of "extraordinary circumstances".
"Articles 5, 6 and 7 of Regulation EC 261/2004 must be interpreted as meaning that passengers whose flights are delayed may be treated, for the purposes of the application of the right to compensation, as passengers whose flights are cancelled and they may thus rely on the right to compensation laid down in Article 7 of the regulation where they suffer, on account of a flight delay, a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours, that is, where they reach their final destination three hours or more after the arrival time originally scheduled by the air carrier."[4]
The fourth Chamber also ruled that under the definition of "extraordinary circumstances", technical faults within an aircraft should not be included and therefore an air carrier cannot rely on a technical fault within an aircraft as a defence from a valid claim under the Regulation.[5] Various passenger rights groups reported the case and encouraged passengers to bring claims against airlines in the event of a delay of over three hours.[6]
The Sturgeon ruling was reconfirmed in a ruling of the European Court of Justice on 23 October 2012 in Nelson v Deutsche Lufthansa AG and R (TUI Travel, British Airways, easyjet and IATA) v Civil Aviation Authority.[7]
In the case of Denise McDonagh v Ryanair Ltd (C-12/11), Third Chamber of European Court of Justice ruled that natural disasters such as the eruption of Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull and the subsequent cloud of volcanic ash in 2010, which shut down most of European air traffic, do constitute "extraordinary circumstances", but not "super-extraordinary circumstances" as laid down in the regulation. If it would have constituted the latter, air carriers would have been released from both the obligation to pay compensation and to provide care. However in the court's ruling it only constituted "extraordinary circumstances", which means they still had an obligation of care towards passengers under Art. 5 and 8 of the regulation.[8]
