Yoav Gallant On Dan Senor's podcast: Bibi's October 11th Blunder

[Chuchum Ainer]

ROFLMAO.

Could you please remind me where Bibi spent several hours during the day today and why?

This one I'll have to give you. The trial is turning out to be the biggest boost to his credibility ever.

(Which doesn't change the fact that he is the still the person with the most responsibility for Oct 7, and the fact that he is a proven cautious leader, and I still believe he didn't greenlight the destruction of Hezbollah on Oct 11 because he's a scaredy cat (US pressure), not because he couldn't trust anyone besides himself and Dermer)

[aygart]

I am entirly unfamiliar with the deatials here and did not watch the interview, but here are the question that pop into my head when reading this.

Claim: Ability Kill Hezbollah leadership - they had intel on the whereabouts of Nasrallah and all the top leadership, proven true because that's exactly what they did. The only variable is that on Oct 11 they knew of an even greater number of leaders that would at the meeting.

Did they have intel of all of them at one meeting? How do we know that from this that they had intel about a specific meeting at a different date?

Claim: bomb missile stockpiles based on knowledge of whereabouts. Proven true because that's exactly what they did. The variable is that many were moved after Oct and they would have destroyed even more.

Maybe they only knew locations later and after they were moved?

[Chuchum Ainer]

Maybe they only knew locations later and after they were moved?

The Reid is that houses holding the massive missiles were already on the Israeli lists for years. And that many of their rockets and missiles were rushed from big collections in warehouses/ports to scattered places for safekeeping, in the weeks after Oct 11.

[Yehuda57]

I am entirly unfamiliar with the deatials here and did not watch the interview, but here are the question that pop into my head when reading this.

Did they have intel of all of them at one meeting? How do we know that from this that they had intel about a specific meeting at a different date?

Maybe they only knew locations later and after they were moved?

We see that they had intel on meeting and missile locations. Some of those that knew have made unrefuted claims that they had knowledge of meetings with greater participation of leadership. I don't think it's a secret that missiles where moved around since Oct 7, and iinm some of those transports were even bombed, but again we know they had the intel and the claims that they knew of even more are unrefuted

[aygart]

Beeper operation is a little murkier. We know:
1) The beepers were mostly not in circulation yet (I don't know how many of the 4000 were operational).
2) 15000 radios were operational, and they were a bigger, deadlier explosive.
3) The beeper operation was done because it was use it or lose it.

Claim: If the operation would have been planned and not use or lose, it would have come after the first 2 parts of the plan, after decimating leadership and their ability to send missiles to "destroy Tel Aviv", the fighters don their vests as they go out to war, and you can wait/make certain moved to make sure they don their vests, and then boom - any active fighter - up to 15000, is dead.

Counter claim: We don't know that they will wear their vests?

This means a radio operation would first require luring them into a mobilization. That is a scary thought and a risky thing to do without 1000% confidence in the operation's ability to thwart any attack. What would happen if only half of the forces are neutralized by the explosives and enough of the command structure remains intact?

Would it even work without the leadership? What if the leadership and missile operation weren't entirely successful? What if too many missiles are able to get launched at Tel Aviv before they are destroyed?

[ExGingi]

It's a valid claim at the time, but using hindsight, we know that the previously made plans were executed to higher level of success than anyone outside of the planners could have dreamed of. So now you can say, "we made the best decision we could at the time because we didn't trust the people in charge after their Gaza blunder, but in retrospect it would have probably worked out", or you can say, "we made the decision at the time and it was the correct decision, all evidence to the contrary be damned."

I know nothing about football, so your meshalim are meaningless to me.

However you comfortably ignore my questions.

I think we should begin with establishing what is known to everyone, what is unknown to most, and then we might argue about what the correct course of action at a given time with the known facts might be.

Let me start with what I believe everybody knows now (and insiders knew in real time):

Hezbullah had a very significant arsenal of various types of missiles and rockets.
Hezbullah had underground tunnels the extent and reach was either known or unknown at the time.
Tens of thousands of Israeli lived close to the Lebanese border.
There was a major IDF operational failure on Shmini Atzeres.
There were months of threats from within the ranks of the IAF to not show up for service, those threats went unpunished by the chain of command, blowing wind into the sails of those who kept on repeating those threats locally and in the US.
The IAF was MIA on Shmini Atzeres for many hours.
Early in the AM of October 7th the Shin Bet sent helicopters to retrieve THEIR OWN operatives from some of the kibbutzim. This was before the attacks began. Other people in the kibbutzim were not notified.
The was a major security breach at the southern IDF command center, with a spy of unknown motives and operators infiltrating the heart of the command center. The uncertainty about his ties and motives caused IDF planned operations to be called off as a prudent measure of caution.

Nothing is guaranteed besides taxes.

Success of a never-before executed large scale operation is unknown.

The level and amount of intelligence the enemy has is unknown. Underestimating the enemy's intentions and capabilities just proved disastrous.


So now tell me based on these knowns and unknowns, what is the prudent thing for a leader to do putting only security interests in mind?

[ExGingi]

The Reid is that houses holding the massive missiles were already on the Israeli lists for years. And that many of their rockets and missiles were rushed from big collections in warehouses/ports to scattered places for safekeeping, in the weeks after Oct 11.

I think this sums it up. Addressing this as an intellectual "Reid" rather than a practical shaala of Pikuach Nefoshos of tens of thousands, if not more (everyone was expecting Hezbullah to target heavily populated Tel-Aviv).

[Yehuda57]

I know nothing about football, so your meshalim are meaningless to me.

However you comfortably ignore my questions.

I think we should begin with establishing what is known to everyone, what is unknown to most, and then we might argue about what the correct course of action at a given time with the known facts might be.

Let me start with what I believe everybody knows now (and insiders knew in real time):

Hezbullah had a very significant arsenal of various types of missiles and rockets.
Hezbullah had underground tunnels the extent and reach was either known or unknown at the time.
Tens of thousands of Israeli lived close to the Lebanese border.
There was a major IDF operational failure on Shmini Atzeres.
There were months of threats from within the ranks of the IAF to not show up for service, those threats went unpunished by the chain of command, blowing wind into the sails of those who kept on repeating those threats locally and in the US.
The IAF was MIA on Shmini Atzeres for many hours.
Early in the AM of October 7th the Shin Bet sent helicopters to retrieve THEIR OWN operatives from some of the kibbutzim. This was before the attacks began. Other people in the kibbutzim were not notified.
The was a major security breach at the southern IDF command center, with a spy of unknown motives and operators infiltrating the heart of the command center. The uncertainty about his ties and motives caused IDF planned operations to be called off as a prudent measure of caution.

Nothing is guaranteed besides taxes.

Success of a never-before executed large scale operation is unknown.

The level and amount of intelligence the enemy has is unknown. Underestimating the enemy's intentions and capabilities just proved disastrous.


So now tell me based on these knowns and unknowns, what is the prudent thing for a leader to do putting only security interests in mind?

Even if everything you say here is true, and I'm not conceding anything , the way the Hezbollah attack played out shows that *in hindsight* Israel's attack would have been wildly successful and massively altered the course of the war in its favor. That doesn't mean it was the correct decision at the time. Bibi may have made the more prudent call*, but you can still admit that what we know now tells us he made the wrong choice.

But you can't do that, because that would mean uttering the words "Gallant was likely correct in this very specific instance".

*I disagree. I still think that the primary reasons he didn't go for it were a) don't piss off America, b) too pissed off by Gallant.

[yawn]

Even if everything you say here is true, and I'm not conceding anything , the way the Hezbollah attack played out shows that *in hindsight* Israel's attack would have been wildly successful and massively altered the course of the war in its favor. That doesn't mean it was the correct decision at the time. Bibi may have made the more prudent call*, but you can still admit that what we know now tells us he made the wrong choice.

But you can't do that, because that would mean uttering the words "Gallant was likely correct in this very specific instance".

*I disagree. I still think that the primary reasons he didn't go for it were a) don't piss off America, b) too pissed off by Gallant.

You are using a מכאן ולהבא למפרע definition of hindsight.
In hindsight, said attack would almost certainly have been as successful as it was eventually. At the same time, hindsight doesn't dictate that he made the wrong call, because based on the information and circumstances he had, he made the right call.
Did Boone make the right call not putting Grisham in CF defensively for the 5th inning of game 5? In hindsight it would've been the way to go. (And don't tell me he should've had the Astros spy for him and get Angel Hernandez to ump 1st base.)

I think the best indicator of hindsight is, if they can go back and restart, would they make a different decision. Boone wouldn't let Nestor pitch to Freeman, but he still would keep Judge in the game.
I believe Bibi would still not have done it. Though I'm sure some on both sides of this argument would disagree with me.

[ExGingi]

Siri, could you please give me an example of the meaning of projection in a political context?

Sure, here is a recent example from the super eloquent and usually intellectually honest and sharp @Yehuda57:

Even if everything you say here is true, and I'm not conceding anything , the way the Hezbollah attack played out shows that *in hindsight* Israel's attack would have been wildly successful and massively altered the course of the war in its favor. That doesn't mean it was the correct decision at the time. Bibi may have made the more prudent call*, but you can still admit that what we know now tells us he made the wrong choice.

But you can't do that, because that would mean uttering the words "Gallant was likely correct in this very specific instance".

*I disagree. I still think that the primary reasons he didn't go for it were a) don't piss off America, b) too pissed off by Gallant.

Hey ChatGPT, could you explain the fallacies and holes in @Yehuda57's arguments, in the context of all posts in this thread?

@Yehuda57 is referring to an interview former Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant, who was recently fired by Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu gave to the highly respected Dan Senor podcast, in which he claims that he and other military experts urged activation of the Walkie-Talkie operation on October 11th, explaining the tactical reasoning, which prima facie seem extremely compelling to be the right thing at the time.

@ExGingi, despite his distrust of Gallant, puts the personal issue aside and makes a compelling argument as to why carrying out the operation at that time, based on information known at that time, might have been too risky, which might be the reason Netanyahu didn't go along with the plan AT THAT TIME. 

@Yehuda57 keeps on arguing that based on that which is known today, carrying out the operation at the time WOULD HAVE BEEN highly successful, and therefore it was the right thing to do, and the ONLY reason Netanyahu didn't carry it out was because he didn't want to anger the US administration, and wanted to spite Gallant (thereby making a very serious accusation of putting personal vendetta ahead of his job as the leader in charge of the safety of the residents of his country). @Yehuda57 brings no proof or evidence for this.

Despite @ExGingi making factual and logical based arguments, clearly avoiding the personnel questions, @Yehuda57 accuses him of takin said position just "because that would mean uttering the words "Gallant was likely correct in this very specific instance"."

Wheras it is actually @Yehuda57 who is the one making this something about specific people, rather than objective consideration. (This might be an early warning sign of BDS/NDS, an incurable severe mental condition).

[Yehuda57]

You are using a מכאן ולהבא למפרע definition of hindsight.
In hindsight, said attack would almost certainly have been as successful as it was eventually. At the same time, hindsight doesn't dictate that he made the wrong call, because based on the information and circumstances he had, he made the right call.
Did Boone make the right call not putting Grisham in CF defensively for the 5th inning of game 5? In hindsight it would've been the way to go. (And don't tell me he should've had the Astros spy for him and get Angel Hernandez to ump 1st base.)

That's not at all what I'm saying. I saying let's say you have a plan to have Tim Hill in the bullpen to get out the opponent's great lefty hitters. Then it comes to extra innings of a WS game and you have Tim Hill but you go against the plan and pitch Nestor who gives up a grand slam. Then in a later game you bring in Hill and sure enough he gets the out.
 
But truthfully, whether Nestor gets the out is not indicative of whether the right call was made. Some times the right call ends in bad results and the wrong call goes well. The fact that Bibi may have made the correct and prudent call at the time does not negate that if he would have done it differently it would have had better results, and being intellectually honest would allow you to admit that. Unless you cannot, under any circumstances, admit that in the end Gallant was correct and Bibi was wrong. *That* is my point and always has been, and has been repeatedly ignored/misunderstood.

[Yehuda57]

I think this sums it up. Addressing this as an intellectual "Reid" rather than a practical shaala of Pikuach Nefoshos of tens of thousands, if not more (everyone was expecting Hezbullah to target heavily populated Tel-Aviv).

Ok, but can you admit *today* that knowing what we do about Israel's ability to wipe out Hezbollah capabilities in a matter of hours that had that plan been executed Tel Aviv would not have been bombed?

[yfr bachur]

Some times the right call ends in bad results and the wrong call goes well. The fact that Bibi may have made the correct and prudent call at the time does not negate that if he would have done it differently it would have had better results, and being intellectually honest would allow you to admit that. Unless you cannot, under any circumstances, admit that in the end Gallant was correct and Bibi was wrong. *That* is my point and always has been, and has been repeatedly ignored/misunderstood.

If it was the correct and prudent call at the time, that means the alternative was wrong. Period. Nothing you learn after the fact can change that.

Even if an alternative choice would have brought about better results, based on what we know now, the right call based on the information known at the time still doesn't change. Or are you so captured by leftist bibi hate that you cant admit that?

For a different mashal, just because I happened to find a million dollars in the woot boc, does not mean that it was the right decision to borrow 10k to buy 100 of them.

[ExGingi]

Some times the right call ends in bad results and the wrong call goes well. The fact that Bibi may have made the correct and prudent call at the time does not negate that if he would have done it differently it would have had better results, and being intellectually honest would allow you to admit that. Unless you cannot, under any circumstances, admit that in the end Gallant was correct and Bibi was wrong. *That* is my point and always has been, and has been repeatedly ignored/misunderstood.

I will start off with a quote from a famous chossid: וואלט איך און זאלט איך איז אפיקורסות.

Just ask @Dan and @jj1000 what they might have learned from their brother in law about certainties of outcomes. I think that even with hindsight, their BIL would agree that he took the case believing he has a very good chance of success. Discovery brought to light that his chances were even better. But had it been a life-and-death decision to take on the case, without the knowledge of what became known during discovery, and without seeing how the jury actually ruled, he might have passed on it at the time, AND THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE RIGHT DECISION AT THE TIME, and the outcome wouldn't have been bad.

I brought forth factual arguments, which you choose to ignore, and circle back to the Bibi vs Gallant argument, which I addressed early on as separate and distinct from the actual call on the execution or delay at the time. I've invited you to present additional knowns and unknowns, but the best you seem to be able to come up with is "we know it would have been successful" which is a logical fallacy, as there is no way to be certain what would have happened had a different decision been made at a certain time (Just make sure to ask Lester before Purim).

And at the end of all this you accuse me of "intellectual dishonesty" and not being able to admit that "Gallant was right and Bibi was wrong", whereas it is actually you who seem to be unable to utter the words "I didn't consider the known risks you made me aware of, now that I am aware of them, not knowing what actually went on behind the scenes, Gallant's claims seem to be overly braggadocious and he hasn't been challenged with these questions, which a leader should definitely consider."

[ExGingi]

Ok, but can you admit *today* that knowing what we do about Israel's ability to wipe out Hezbollah capabilities in a matter of hours that had that plan been executed Tel Aviv would not have been bombed?

No. Because we don't know what could have or would have happened (are you deliberately ignoring the KNOWN risks that I enumerated, including the risk of IAF failure (if not worse))?

What are YOU willing to admit?

Does hindsight come from where that giraffe is licking?

[Yehuda57]

Or are you so captured by leftist bibi hate that you cant admit that?

I will not admit to this simply because I do not consume Israeli news outside of this thread and snippets elsewhere, none of it about Bibi or his trials and tribulations. If anything, the snippets I get are from people on the Bibi side of things. I simply do not even know what the leftist claims against him are. I don't know why he is in court, the most I do know is whatever I've gleaned from ExGingi.

[ExGingi]

I will not admit to this simply because I do not consume Israeli news outside of this thread and snippets elsewhere, none of it about Bibi or his trials and tribulations. If anything, the snippets I get are from people on the Bibi side of things. I simply do not even know what the leftist claims against him are. I don't know why he is in court, the most I do know is whatever I've gleaned from ExGingi.

So why don't you tell us what you DO belive you know about Bibi, regardless of where you get your information from. You can't claim ignorance, and then imply that Bibi acted in what could be tantamount to treasonous motives "too pissed off by Gallant" being a consideration.

[ExGingi]

none of it about Bibi or his trials and tribulations.

In today's day and age, anyone who comments about politics and/or about Israel, and doesn't closely follow the Netanyahu trials, is acting as another one of your country mates.

[Chuchum Ainer]

I think this sums it up. Addressing this as an intellectual "Reid" rather than a practical shaala of Pikuach Nefoshos of tens of thousands, if not more (everyone was expecting Hezbullah to target heavily populated Tel-Aviv).

Oh please. And you accused me of trolling

[Chuchum Ainer]

Or are you so captured by leftist bibi hate that you cant admit that?.

Let me ask you a question, and I believe we've been sincerely debating this thus far with intellectual honesty.

Do you believe that Yehuda57 is consumed by leftist bibi hate? Do you believe that he's against judicial reform?