Yoav Gallant On Dan Senor's podcast: Bibi's October 11th Blunder

[Chuchum Ainer]

Hard disagree.
The deal was forced upon the Israeli Govt by pressure.
It went against ALL known facts and risk assessments.

We clearly are going to heavy disagree as to what counts as "forced."

But leaving that aside, why wouldn't you say this decision was also "forced by pressure"? The US was heavily pressuring Israel not to do it. So maybe it also "went against ALL known facts and risk assessments."

[yelped]

Because no one has provided an objective fact that shows that it would not have worked.

Couldn't rely on the intel? Turns out we could.
Couldn't rely on the soldiers? Turns out we could.
Would cause missiles to rain on Tel Aviv? Turns out it didn't.
America would not support Israel? Turns out they will.
And on and on.

Again, it's rare that you get to see both endings of a choose your own adventure in real life. Obviously the situation a year later is different, but like I said above, there's arguably more reason to say it would have been better at the beginning of the war than the middle. We saw what happened when they say in the border allowing missiles to rain and then what happened when they unleashed the plan after being forced into it.

Not only did Israel not suffer, it neutered Hezbollah, undressed Iran, and led to Syria's collapse. Imagine going to war in Gaza on *that* backdrop?

I'm not saying it couldn't have worked. What I'm saying is, you can't be so confident to say that the Israelis should have been so confident that it will work just because it worked 15 months later. It doesn't work like that, despite the Israeli bluster. It was a gamble and as a lose it or use it, was the right gamble to take. Was it kedai to have done this on October 8th? Maybe. But I don't see why you would take issue with others recognizing the limitations of being anal armchair general with this one.

[Chuchum Ainer]

Lets take this "was it the right decision" discussion into a related topic.

No one needs a commission of inquiry to tell them that ST was immediately caused by an epic operational failure of the IDF, which was caused and preceded by an epic intelligence failure.
A long term look shows that Hamas was enabled to get to that point by Bibi's strategic decision to allow Hamas to retain power and strength in Gaza, in order to forstall a reconciliation between the various Palestinian factions that would lead to increased international pressure on Israel to come to a final status agreement with the PA. (For this BTW, the leftists on whatever commission is formed will try to have him hung in thentown square) This in turn was, at least in part, based on A. the analysis by the intelligence community that Hamas was no longer interested in war, just sabre rattling, and wanted to stay in power (and get rich etc...). B. the assumption that the mossad and shin bet would be able to provide sufficient warning in event of a Hamas attack.

Now that ST happened, and the assumptions and analysis of the intelligence community that Bibi relied upon when formulating his strategy visa vi Hamas were proved to be incorrect, was Bibis decisions wrong?

Long discussion for a different time.
But yes, the price of Bibi's strategic plan are clear. And anyone who !at the time! said that bibi was wrong, can now continue to say that it is. (Bennett, lieberman, ahranowitch spring to mind, the right flank if the security cabinet in 2014)

In 1973 the Meir and Dayan made a decision based on the known facts and risk assessments, including an assessment of what could be lost or gained by ignoring or recognizing American wishes. Are you uncomfortable saying they were wrong?

(Leaving aside that the *strategic* failure of oct 7 is much much worse, as is the operational/security failure. Only the intelligence failure is analogous)

[yawn]

You don't even need to get to the Iranian issue.

Think about where Israel would be today without the US military aid. Basic Munitions...
Think about where Israel would be today without any protection of a veto in the Security Council over the last few decades.
What does an Israel under international sanctions and boycotts look like?

Military aid, Israel would probably manufacture most of it on their own if America cut them off.
Security council and sanctions affect Israel economically. But if Israel is facing a security threat and they feel hamstrung by America, you do what you gotta do and face austerity. I am asking about Iran because I don't see how any security threat can outweigh the threat posed by a nuclear Iran.

[Yehuda57]

Lets try this one last time.

You (and Yoav Gallant) have an assumption, not based on anything other than your gut feelings, that if Israel activates its walkie-talkie/beeper plan on October 11, than every other event action and decision (both by Israels friends and foes) that has occurred in the year and a half since would have been exactly the same, and therefore Gallants plan was right in hindsight.

No. I am looking at an argument from the outside.
Gallant is saying that he proposed a plan that had already be put into place before Oct 7. One that Bibi was part of creating and approved of.
He proposed that plan with the knowledge that Bibi had agreed with previously on how it would play out in all likelihood, albeit without certainty as that never exists.
Bibi turned down using that plan.

Then, many months later, the plan was executed albeit slightly differently than originally intended.
It played out exactly as predicted by Gallant and Bibi.
To know that it would be successful is not a gut feel or assumption, it's based on hard knowledge of the plan and the enemies.

I, viewing as an outsider, saw both positions, and it seems to me that no reasonable explanation can be given why the plan would not have worked. This is not an assumption, I used the highest burden of proof used in courts of law - reasonable doubt. None of the doubts presented here seem reasonable to me that it would not have been successful. Certainty is impossible. This is about as close as you can get in the circumstances.

To say the trickle down effects of the operation would definitely be exactly the same is not what Gallant or I claimed. Though I maintain that the liklihood is that it would have been even better.

Our rebuttal is twofold. One, you have no right to make that assumption, it is more likely than not that many, many things would be different.

Seeing as it is not an "assumption" but the predicted plan of the military, intelligence, prime minister, and every other branch of Israeli security establishment, I fail to see how it is more than likely it would not succeed.

Two, those making the decisions at the time did not KNOW what any of these events actions and decisions would be, and therefore the only possible right plan/decision that could be made is the one that was correct based on the known facts and various risk assessments on October 11 - which you yourself have already admitted was the Bibi decision!

I did not admit that at all. I conceded that it was a reasonable decision not to trust Gallant, and *may* have been correct.

No one ever KNOWS. But you do your best and plan. In this case we see how both panned out! Even if you think Bibi made the right call with the knowledge he had at the time, you must, if looking at it objectively without attaching names, see that everything Gallant said would occur at the time (that until 5 days prior Bibi would have said the same) *did* occur a year later.

[Yehuda57]

You don't even need to get to the Iranian issue.

Think about where Israel would be today without the US military aid. Basic Munitions...
Think about where Israel would be today without any protection of a veto in the Security Council over the last few decades.
What does an Israel under international sanctions and boycotts look like?

This is where you and I will not agree. If my understanding of the Rebbe's view is correct, I believe this is his view: Decisions of pikuach nefesh are to be made by the military and military only. Political considerations should not be made when the military says lives are on the line.

will only serve to cost lives. Act strong and do what you need to do to save lives and the politics will sort itself out. The Yom Kippur war is a classic example of the harm. There are numerous examples of the positive, such as the nuclear reactor bombing in Iraq. America "punished" Israel and them later thanked them. There are many other examples, including in this war.

America did not want Israel in Rafah, to kill Haniyeh, to kill Nasrallah, etc. But when push came to shove, they didn't back down from Israel, even if they did block some weapons. My contention is that it would have been worse had Israel appeased more, and better had they gone full throttle and not delayed Rafah, for instance.

[gozalim]

Remember the US moving entire carrier fleets to be near Israel to deter other actors from joining in the fun of hitting Israel when they are down. Who could it be that they were detering? What would have been if IL would have run the WT and 📟 operation, and the US reacted by saying, "oh, you want a wide regional conflict...you are on your own "?

what this part does make pretty clear, at the time US very much preferred Israel restrict its actions to Gaza, not create a regional war. (it is plausible, but not certain, that months later when they finally did attack Lebanon, that this distinction on part of US was less stark, both because the ongoing attacks from he north kept residents displaced for so long, as well as the fact that the gaza op was losing support as well).
It would be shocking if this didn't color the decision making at the time. That doesn't change what @Yehuda57 insists that Israel is (always) best served by ignoring outside pressure and following what best serves its military security needs

[yawn]

(it is plausible, but not certain, that months later when they finally did attack Lebanon, that this distinction on part of US was less stark, both because the ongoing attacks from he north kept residents displaced for so long, as well as the fact that the gaza op was losing support as well).

What changed was that Hezbollah killed 10 kids in Majdal Shams, so Israel was no longer broadening a conflict, but responding to a provocation.

[Yehuda57]

What changed was that Hezbollah killed 10 kids in Majdal Shams, so Israel was no longer broadening a conflict, but responding to a provocation.

America did not approve any of the actions against Hezbollah even after those kids were killed.
Israel was not provoking anything on Oct 11 or any other time in the war. Hezbollah had started the missiles on Oct 8th, completely unprovoked. *That* "broadened the conflict".

The fact that Israel shamefully displaced tends of thousands of citizens for months on end and only decided to finally attack because they'd lose their beeper attack is not proof of careful military strategy to protect its citizens but a disgraceful display of how appeasement leads to discarding the lives of "unimportant" citizens to protect the political power of the elites.

[ExGingi]

Because no one has provided an objective fact that shows that it would not have worked.

Couldn't rely on the intel? Turns out we could.
Couldn't rely on the soldiers? Turns out we could.
Would cause missiles to rain on Tel Aviv? Turns out it didn't.
America would not support Israel? Turns out they will.
And on and on.

I find it so hard to believe that you, of all people, are so blinded to the extent that you miss the logical fallacies you keep on repeating.

Since you don't seem to address my argument, I will try to rephrase it so it might become more evident.

In order to do so, I will digress for a moment and respond to a different post of yours.

This is where you and I will not agree. If my understanding of the Rebbe's view is correct, I believe this is his view: Decisions of pikuach nefesh are to be made by the military and military only. Political considerations should not be made when the military says lives are on the line.

will only serve to cost lives. Act strong and do what you need to do to save lives and the politics will sort itself out. The Yom Kippur war is a classic example of the harm. There are numerous examples of the positive, such as the nuclear reactor bombing in Iraq. America "punished" Israel and them later thanked them. There are many other examples, including in this war.

America did not want Israel in Rafah, to kill Haniyeh, to kill Nasrallah, etc. But when push came to shove, they didn't back down from Israel, even if they did block some weapons. My contention is that it would have been worse had Israel appeased more, and better had they gone full throttle and not delayed Rafah, for instance.

I won't go into the issue of whether this is your own understanding after learning what the Rebbe says, or you are just blindly following the Rebbe. Either way, I'm not sure to what extent you are familiar with the Rebbe's guidance.

As far as I can recall, some people tried to argue that those advocating the more "dovish" stand are people with great military background, so they should be trusted to have military expertise. However, the Rebbe argues that once they enter politics, their opinions are worthy of being dismissed, as there are other motives involved.

While the above was true about ex-generals (Gallant qualifying as such) at the time, nowadays (at least for the past 15-20 years, the IDF itself has become highly politicized (somewhat evident by the anomaly compared to other democracies, of ex-generals entering politics). Unfortunately, those politics are mostly one-sided, with many generals being "educated" by the Wexner foundation. Top IDF brass has been protecting their own milieu, and the appointment of Hertzi Halevi as IDF Chief-of-Staff by a transitional government, when the term of the then-active IDF chief of staff wouldn't have run out until several months after the upcoming election, is probably the most glaring example of the politicization of the military top brass.

With that in mind, I'd appreciate if you could enlighten me as to who exactly do you consider to be an Israeli military expert devoid of any political or other ulterior motives.

Again, it's rare that you get to see both endings of a choose your own adventure in real life. Obviously the situation a year later is different, but like I said above, there's arguably more reason to say it would have been better at the beginning of the war than the middle. We saw what happened when they say in the border allowing missiles to rain and then what happened when they unleashed the plan after being forced into it.

Not only did Israel not suffer, it neutered Hezbollah, undressed Iran, and led to Syria's collapse. Imagine going to war in Gaza on *that* backdrop?

Again, I find it hard to believe that such arguments are coming from you.

How in the world could you claim with such certainty "turns out that we could", or "it would have been" etc. etc.?

If indeed the entire plan was ready for many years, why activate it on October 11th 2023? Were there no other "opportunities" for it to be activated?

Should I point you to the Rebbe's rejection of extrapolation as proof as opposed to interpolation?

Should I point out to you the MATERIAL differences that exist between the time the beeper operation was carried out, to October 11th 2023? I would not find this necessary under normal circumstances, but for some reason that is beyond me, you seem to be under some kind of שחד that is blinding your usually brilliant and sharp vision and thinking, so I will point out a few MATERIAL differences which would at the very least prove as a challenge to your attempt to draw your mental extrapolation exercise as something that could be the equivalent of the legal burden of "beyond a reasonable doubt" (which in matters of Pikuach Nefesh is probably insufficient, but IANAR. The following are independent of my prior argument of the right decision a leader should take given the knowledge available at the time, and are focused on pointing out the fallacy of your painting a clear extrapolation exercise as "beyond reasonable doubt". I will go in no specific order.

1. You mention the fall of the Assad regime. This is definitely NOT something that was expected, or that Israel was prepared for at such a rapid pace after the beeper operation. Thankfully they were able to take proper security measures, and nobody knows how things will play out. An additional volatile front, giving the Turkish Sultan direct access to the Israeli border is definitely not something anyone prepared for, or welcomed. Such an outcome could have thrown everything into a greater turmoil, tying not only Turkey, but also Russia into the conflict. This after years of Israel doing everything in its power to make sure the Assad regime doesn't fall.

2. By the time Eid-Al-Beeper was celebrated, there had been several major accomplishments under the belt, none of which were there on October 11th 2023, and without them being inscribed in history, there was no-way of knowing how things might play out:

2a. The coalition that included the JORDANIANS thwarting the Iranian drone and missile attack.

2b. The elimination of Ismail Haniyeh IN TEHRAN! The elimination of Nasrallah while Netanyahu was preparing for a UN speech in NY, and more!

2c. Greater preparedness of the IDF, which was by all accounts unprepared in the initial days, this includes reservists, as well as evolving honing of strategy based on gathered intelligence as well as recalibration of intelligence ASSESMENTS on all fronts.

2d. I'm sorry for bringing this up again, but it is material - the complete uncertainty about the enemy's intelligence, plans, and capabilities. This doesn't mean that whatever knowledge was there at the time was incorrect, but rather that there was sufficient evidence to QUESTION the level of certainty and trust of the intelligence.

3. The political climate in the US (time until the elections, actual candidates running, etc. etc. - Bibi, and Israeli intelligence, doesn't need me to tell them who was pulling the strings and calling the shots during the Biden years, and definitely didn't need me to tell them that it wasn't Biden).

Now lets go back to the argument (which I generally agree with) that a "hawkish" approach that ignores politics and shows bold strength is the right way to deal with security threats. You seem to argue that Netanyahu (the N in NDS) wasn't hawkish enough, and you use your extrapolation as evidence. While I am arguing that even if the decision were to be BASED ONLY ON WHAT YOU AND I KNOW AS FACT, and not even considering the obvious that there is a lot more that we don't know, it seems to be prudent, and fully in-line with the Rebbe's teachings of ignoring any political considerations (by which you claim Netanyahu's judgement is stained) and putting Pikuach Nefesh above all, to have not executed the plan on October 11th 2023.

As you correctly stated "beyond a reasonable doubt" is a hurdle that needs to be crossed in criminal cases. It is sorely insufficient in critical life and death mission design, were redundancies and through testing and modeling is required (think about space missions, or expeditions to visit the Titanic as examples, or even drug approval).

All of this has nothing to do with politics, or with the people involved. If you want to go there, then I will present that there is nothing more obvious as being purely political as Gallant going public with this in English at this time!

I have my criticism of Bibi, which I am unashamed of (namely his insistent כפירה, and his strong belief in Zionism/כחי ועצם ידי). That being said, I can understand where you might be coming from, because Netanyahu is somewhat of an anomaly in the global political scene. He is very strong in his beliefs, he is extremely smart and often avoids pitfalls that others fall into (almost any politician could be crushed with the level of lawfare being thrown at Bibi), and despite being a politician, he is probably (one of, if not) the most honest ones to walk on the plant during my lifetime. If you would acquaint yourself a little better with Bibi's principles and MO, you would realize how far fetched your allegations are (should I remind you of the US and Global shock at Bibi lecturing BHO during his visit to the White House? Something no other world leader ever did to a US president, let alone an ally).

[Yehuda57]

While the above was true about ex-generals (Gallant qualifying as such) at the time,

Sorry, I meant to say above, but I 100% put Gallant in the politician category. His past military roles notwithstanding, his was a political role in this war.

My opinion of *this particular instance* is despite his politics, not because of them

[ExGingi]

America did not approve any of the actions against Hezbollah even after those kids were killed.
Israel was not provoking anything on Oct 11 or any other time in the war. Hezbollah had started the missiles on Oct 8th, completely unprovoked. *That* "broadened the conflict".

The fact that Israel shamefully displaced tends of thousands of citizens for months on end and only decided to finally attack because they'd lose their beeper attack is not proof of careful military strategy to protect its citizens but a disgraceful display of how appeasement leads to discarding the lives of "unimportant" citizens to protect the political power of the elites.

Since there is no "split" like button, I need to respond to this by stating that I completely agree with your first paragraph, and only agree with the first few words of your second paragraph (shameful displacement) as most of what you write beyond that correct statement (it is shameful regardless of the motives or even if we agree that it is the absolute correct thing to do) is speculation based on what you FEEL was going on behind the scenes.

[ExGingi]

My opinion of *this particular instance* is despite his politics, not because of them

Can we agree that in *this particular instance* the fact that he went public with this *in English*, and *at this time* is 100% political (and wrong, even if his argument is right - which I don't believe it is, and you seem to believe it as gospel, despite all the factual challenges presented).

[Yehuda57]

Since there is no "split" like button, I need to respond to this by stating that I completely agree with your first paragraph, and only agree with the first few words of your second paragraph (shameful displacement) as most of what you write beyond that correct statement (it is shameful regardless of the motives or even if we agree that it is the absolute correct thing to do) is speculation based on what you FEEL was going on behind the scenes.

Netanyahu stated publicly his aims for the war.
1) Free the hostages
2) Destroy Hamas

How long did it take from displacement until he added returning the citizens in the north to a goal of the war?

In this both sides are equally at fault. No one cared about the north, to my knowledge

[Yehuda57]

Can we agree that in *this particular instance* the fact that he went public with this *in English*, and *at this time* is 100% political (and wrong, even if his argument is right - which I don't believe it is, and you seem to believe it as gospel, despite all the factual challenges presented).

I already said he's on a press tour and pounding his chest, which I despise.

He did make the same claims in Hebrew first, iiuc

[ExGingi]

I already said he's on a press tour and pounding his chest, which I despise.

He did make the same claims in Hebrew first, iiuc

So you just despise it and accept it as part of the political game (I despise all politicians. I think I've previously made this clear), or is there something more sinister to it?

Is it being sponsored by someone?

Is it related somehow to the assessment of many that he acted as a foreign agent/trojan horse within the Israeli security cabinet (and broader political scheme)?

Can you share any link or source for him making these claims in Hebrew prior to making them in English?

[Yehuda57]

So you just despise it and accept it as part of the political game (I despise all politicians. I think I've previously made this clear), or is there something more sinister to it? Is it being sponsored by someone? Is it related somehow to the assessment of many that he acted as a foreign agent/trojan horse within the Israeli security cabinet (and broader political scheme)?

Can you share any link or source for him making these claims in Hebrew prior to making them in English?

Iinm, Dan Senor mentioned it in his intro? Maybe I heard it elsewhere.

If Gallant was coming today and making the claim, fine. But this fits prefectly with what was reported at the time, in leaks that, if memory serves, came from the Bibi camp.

Bibi was trying to portray him as a crazy guy who wanted to take on the mighty Hezbollah at a time of wars on other fronts, a powerful Hezbollah that would rain missiles on Tel Aviv and make Oct 7 look like a joke compared to what their soldiers could do on the ground.

But many months later we found out what the plan actually was, and it included eliminating Nasrallah and almost all his henchmen, 80% of the rockets, and killing up to 15000 Hezbollah fighters in a matter of hours, without a single Israeli ground soldier needing to tie his shoes.

I'm not even sure if our original disagreement on this topic came before the beeper attack or after.

[yfr bachur]

Can you share any link or source for him making these claims in Hebrew prior to making them in English?

He was on channel 12 in Israel the day before
https://mobile.mako.co.il/news-military/2025_q1/Article-f0dc39bc717d491027.htm
Via google translation

The debate with Netanyahu in the closed room, and the dramatic discussion about the elimination of Nasrallah | Yoav Galant in his first interview with Channel 12
The former defense minister appears in front of the camera for the first time - since taking office in early 2023 • Since then, he has undergone a turbulent term, which ended with a letter of dismissal from the prime minister • Returning to the morning of October 7 ("My daughter called me"), regretting the conversation he did not participate in on the night of the attack ("The deepest frustration I have ever had in my life") - and what he demanded three days later: "The planes were in the air" • Watch
Yonit Levy
 |
Fellow
 |
The main edition |
Published 21:35 06.02.25

 156  177,138
Former Defense Minister Yoav Galant appears for his first on-camera interview - and answers all the questions: the October 7th debacle, the failed concept, and the conduct during the war, and also reveals what Netanyahu told him in closed rooms when he demanded fateful decisions be made.

Default October 7
October 7, 6:29 a.m. How do you get the news? Who's calling you?
My daughter calls me from Tel Aviv and tells me: "There are alarms in Tel Aviv." A minute later I pick up the phone to the Chief of Staff and he tells me: "It's from Gaza, it's not just rockets, there's something on the ground here too - I'm going in to assess the situation."

I change into my cycling clothes, I was just on my way to a bike ride and put on the black clothes. When I get to the village, I see that the lack of clarity in the picture is very large.

What faces do you meet there?
The feeling of overload and failure is clearly visible. On the other hand, the people are functioning. First of all, I look at the Chief of Staff, he is functioning: giving orders, getting things together.


The Chief of Staff is busy managing the military system and I don't bother him at this hour. But I enter his room to assess his situation before eight in the morning, and I see that there is a sense of misunderstanding here. There is no loss of temper, but there is a sense of misunderstanding, that they don't know what is happening everywhere.

Does he understand that this is a war?
I think he understands well.

There's a point where you say, 'How come you didn't tell me?' After all, the first time you encounter this is at 6:29 in the morning on your daughter's phone? None of the discussions that happen during the night reach you?
We are now dealing with how to resolve the situation and I am fully focused on this issue.

Aren't you shocked?
No. At eight in the situation assessment, I tell everyone: "This is war." Open all the warehouses, everything there is, recruit everyone you can, regulars and reserves. Send them south, it's already happening, but also north. Because I don't think Hamas will start a war without Hezbollah being a partner.

By the way, when we find Hamas' computers and hard drives in December and then in February, it is completely clear that Hamas intended for Hezbollah to join.

Former Defense Minister Yoav Galant in his first interview (Photo: News 12)
Former Defense Minister Yoav Galant in his first interview | Photo : News 12
How do you meet the Prime Minister on this day?
I think the Prime Minister was in a very gloomy mood, not only on that day, but also afterwards on October 11th and in the run-up to the maneuver. He had a very pessimistic message that I did not share.

Pessimistic to the point of existential danger?
The outlook was very pessimistic, that we need to be focused, sober in order to make a correct assessment of the situation.

When do you first meet him at the time?
We meet in the early hours.

Is it fully functional?
I don't give grades to the Prime Minister, how he functions or does not function.

Because you said that the Chief of Staff is functioning.
When I meet him, things are working, functioning, but the mood is pessimistic and the broadcast is pessimistic.

I'm trying to understand when the Minister of Defense of the State of Israel realizes that territories in Israel have been occupied by Hamas, and what do you feel at that moment when you realize that?
I understand that there is a broad attack here. That the intelligence means were damaged, the observations and so on. The picture is not flowing, it certainly does not pass the ten echelons from the soldier to the Minister of Defense.

The failure of that day was not only the surprise. It was also the fact that it took long hours, about eight hours, until there was a significant military force in the communities. The Nahal Oz base was captured, communities were captured, Nir Oz was forgotten, 251 Israelis were kidnapped. And all the correspondence of that day asks one question, where is the army?
The collision from a state of rapid movement to a collision with a wall necessitates a process of preparation. This process takes time. When there are four battalions in a sector and additional battalions need to be brought in, they need to be brought in either from training or from Judea and Samaria or from somewhere else, and this process takes time.

So the first ones to come are the special units, and the ones to come after them are the special infantry battalions, and after that, everything else. In my opinion, this is a point of failure that we must examine in a state investigation committee, not just in the military investigation, we must discuss it. If there is one thing that is the deepest frustration I have in my life - it is that they didn't wake me up at night.

why?
Because I'm sure I would ask, could it be that you're downplaying the threat and there's something more significant? That would mean bringing in more planes and more ground forces, certainly the commanders.

At what point do you even realize in the morning in the Kirya that there were a series of consultations during the night that you were not informed about at all?
It takes days, not minutes. I spoke with the Chief of Staff only months later, I didn't bother asking him where you failed or where someone else failed. I bothered to see how we were winning the war and achieving its goals.

The warning statement following the legal revolution
On March 25, 2011, Gallant issued a statement to the media, warning: "The widening rift in society is penetrating the IDF and the security agencies. This is a clear, immediate, and tangible danger to the security of the state."

As Minister of Defense, don't you take the Chief of Staff into a room and tell him, from now on, every warning you receive, you will take it 10 times more seriously?
The information I am releasing to the public is only a fraction of what is known in the defense establishment, known to the Prime Minister and everyone else. I take it very seriously. The actual reform has been halted in many ways as a result of this move.

And then war broke out.
I'm not saying it was a deterrent, but it's definitely a contributing factor. It's very difficult to predict what would have happened if it had.

This is also a whole concept, which you also shared, which says that Hamas is deterred.
You are in the Gaza Division, saying: "Hamas' methods of operation are being negated, "Hamas remains with rockets, it is in a state of weakness."
First of all, I think that when a defense minister has to make decisions, he should rely on the information that comes to him, either from intelligence or from all discussions with senior officials and others - or from field tours.

And you don't get any indication of anything from them?
I don't even get a comma. For example, in May 2011, Operation Shield and Arrow is taking place against Islamic Jihad in Gaza. I ask the commanders, I ask the senior officials, "Is there anything Hamas can do?", "Is there anything that can happen?" - and the answer is no, not by a large margin. Hamas is quiet.

What about the "Jericho Wall" plan?
I hear about it a month after the war, the concept of "the Walls of Jericho" - I didn't know it. I'm frustrated, after all, it's a combination of two things. One, what happened up until October 7th, and the second is the night of October 7th. I need to be investigated, the Prime Minister, the Chief of Staff, the head of the Shin Bet. All the rest. I don't want to determine the results in advance, I'll accept whatever a commission of inquiry says.

We also need to go back a decade, because there are conditions here that created this. There was a large flow of Qatari money, there was a rift in Israeli society, and there were also Israeli provocations of pilgrimage to the Temple Mount and other things.

Do you think that the ascent to the Temple Mount was among the things that led to October 7?
It's explosive. It's very upsetting, we know that from information.

National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir ascended the Temple Mount (Photo: Temple Mount Administration)
Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir on the Temple Mount | Photo : Temple Mount Administration
Where is your responsibility within everything we are describing now?
First of all, I am responsible for what happened from the beginning of January 2023, on October 7, until I finished my duties on November 7, 2024. I remember my conversation with Reuma Benir Oz, which came as a surprise. I listened to her with great attention, and it was perhaps one of the most difficult moments in my life. It is such a difficult thing, so tragic to hear her. Everything she says, she is right.

Do you also feel guilty about what happened?
Responsibility is something we have to bear. Regarding the blame, I suggest putting it in the hands of those who are authorized to do so. I have great pain and sorrow.

There was a concept here of an entire country, from the Prime Minister down, with the exception of V. from the Defense Ministry, that says, Hamas is deterred. The Chief of Staff knows the "Walls of Jericho"
I'm not sure the Chief of Staff knows at this point. I suggest you ask him.

All the information was in the Intelligence Division and they didn't pass it on? Not to the Chief of Staff, not to the Minister of Defense, not to the Prime Minister. Did this happen due to negligence?
No, I don't think there are bad people here. And I also don't think there is intentional negligence here.

As Minister of Defense, you failed, you failed because under you the greatest phenomenon of refusal to serve the state occurred.
Refusal is something that must be condemned in every way. The hammer treatment is one type of treatment, there are things that must be done with great force and there are things that must be done with explanation, you have to understand something, unlike any other country, the things that happen in the public flow into the military system.

The apocalyptic descriptions that said there would be no air force and the refusals, did they encourage Sinwar to go to this war?
I don't think there was a connection between the descriptions, they were looking mainly at what they saw on the streets and inside the Knesset. They said to themselves, 'Do we need to do something now?' And I came to the conclusion that the only thing I could do was go to the public.

I understand the meaning of my speech, I tell my family: "I'm 80% sure that next week I'll be sitting with you on the balcony 'as a citizen who is not the Minister of Defense.'"

The Prime Minister calls me into his office, and I tell him he's making a mistake, and not just because of me, but because it's not right for the State of Israel, and I walk out.

Were you surprised by the reaction on the street? What do you see from the 14th floor?
Starting to pack. I look from the office and I see bonfires on Ayalon. It pretty much stunned me, I didn't expect this. The next day I was in a discussion with the Prime Minister with the defense establishment and when I was about to enter the door that was open in the cabinet room, the Prime Minister was already inside. The first question he asked and I heard it through the door was, "Where is the Minister of Defense?" At that moment I realized that they weren't going to fire me.

How can you continue like this, after such an event, to wage war, when this is what is between you?
My relationship with Netanyahu is not a difficult one. We talked continuously about everything that was necessary, there were phone calls and also one-on-one conversations when necessary. In all the discussions, I, and I think he too, addressed things in a matter-of-fact manner when significant things were at stake.

Benjamin Netanyahu, Yoav Galant (Photo: Reuters)
Galant next to Netanyahu | Photo : Reuters
The dramatic debate on October 11
On October 11, it is a critical day that Israeli citizens may not know the whole picture.
This is the main crossroads in the war after October 7. This is the biggest security blunder of the State of Israel, in my opinion, since its establishment. We knew that Hezbollah senior leaders were going to gather. We would launch an airstrike and eliminate the **** heads of Hezbollah, and also the Iranians, Nasrallah, and all the rest. The entire top of Hezbollah.

Immediately afterwards, the plan to attack the entire missile and rocket array would have been activated, as it was activated almost a year later in September, and we would have achieved not 70 or 80 percent success, but 90 percent or more because a large portion of the rockets were concentrated in warehouses. And the third thing, the story of the beepers: the ones we encounter when they explode a year later in Lebanon.

Were there thousands of pagers on October 11th?
Obviously. The operation was ready long before the war. This meant that Hezbollah as a military organization ceased to exist: there was no leadership, no missiles and rockets, most of the operatives were killed in the field.

And all this three days after October 7th
We would release a significant number of SDF from the north and operate not only in Gaza, but also in Khan Yunis and Rafah simultaneously. The second thing is, we would not evacuate the residents of the north.

When do you come to the Prime Minister and tell him, look, this is the option, let's do this and that?
I arrive at the Prime Minister's at 11 o'clock.

What time is the Shian?
The time for the meeting should be around six in the evening. You have seven hours now to convince the cabinet. And when I reach the Prime Minister, the answer I get is - 'We have to talk to the President of the United States.' At that moment I realize that this is a process of not doing.

At the Prime Minister's request, I spoke with Jake Sullivan (then the National Security Advisor). After a few minutes, Ron Dermer joins the conversation, and I hear a resounding no.

I go back to the Prime Minister, and I tell him, "We have to do this." He shows me from the window (of the Prime Minister's office in Tel Aviv) the buildings and says to me: "Do you see these buildings? All of this will be destroyed as a result of Hezbollah's residual capability. After we hit them, they will destroy everything you see."

When I said I didn't share the feeling of pessimism, I talked about it, I saw that all along. By the way, it wasn't just said to me. It was said after that in security consultations and later on, and even when I raised this issue many times during the war, there was a return to this issue.

Do you understand that Gantz and Eisenkot are being brought into the government to stop this plan of yours?
Usually, history doesn't allow you to go back in time. Something happened here. The history that happened the following year proved that under much, much less favorable conditions, we achieved very impressive results.

Is it true that the planes were stopped in mid-air on their way to the operation?
The planes were in the air. During the discussion, I understand that the meeting may disperse. This is the meeting we want to attack, and even if we make a decision in the next half hour, we may miss the point when we take off the planes. I tell the Chief of Staff, "Take off the planes." From now on, time is limited, up to an hour, maybe a little less.

But when we enter the cabinet and the prime minister says, "Gantz, what do you think?", he's against. "Eizenkot, what do you think?", he's against. And Netanyahu himself is against, that was already clear to me. The operation was ready.

Are you signing this as Minister of Defense?
Obviously, I look at things professionally and calmly. Professionally and calmly, I inherited that from my mother, as the pressure increases, my heart rate decreases, that's the situation. And I look at the situation and say: We have a historic opportunity here to turn the tide, to do to Hezbollah something that is usually impossible to do.

The ground maneuver in Gaza
At this point, Gallant describes what Netanyahu told him in closed rooms - before the ground maneuver in the Gaza Strip.

Before the maneuver, the Prime Minister told me we would have thousands of deaths in Gaza. I told him there wouldn't be thousands of deaths and moreover, what do we have an army for? If after they killed a thousand of our civilians and kidnapped them and killed women and children and the elderly, we don't activate it? Then came the reasoning that said, "They will use the kidnapped as human targets."

Did Netanyahu say that?
Yes. I told him, we and Hamas share only one thing, with these human animals. We both want to protect the kidnapped, they are because for them it is some kind of tool and for us it is our children and it is the purpose of war.

What did he want to do?
I'm telling you that the struggle to get into the maneuver was not easy. I was with the forces as early as October 8, the message that came out of the force was that you always tell us and it never happens. And after a week it was, release us from the reserves because you're not serious. When I returned to the cabinet, it became clear to me that there were people there whose political experience was greater than mine or people whose military rank in the reserves was more senior than mine, who thought the same thing.

There was a struggle here. This whole thing takes time, in the end, the Chief of Staff and I come to this decision.

Yoav Galant in an interview with Leonit Levy and Amit Segal
Yoav Galant in an interview with Leonit Levy and Amit Segal
Are you basically saying that if you didn't press, Netanyahu, Eisenkot, and Gantz would end the war with pure aerial bombing?
I don't want to talk about person A or person B. In the end, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet voted on the matter and approved it unanimously.

We can eliminate Haniyeh in Iran and eliminate Nasrallah. Don't we know that Hamas is building floors upon floors of tunnels right under our noses?
I think the internalization of this information, the interest in it, the attention regarding Iran, Hezbollah, and other things - were not in the appropriate focus.

Suddenly you're speaking in the second person, gone.
This is a 15-year phenomenon.

No, but also your year and 9 months.
I remind you that billions flowed into the Gaza Strip.

Have you ever spoken out against this?
I don't think so. This process flowed, as it did in my time. I wasn't exposed to any information about what this thing does either.

Didn't you think it was funding terrorism?
I am convinced that this is something that must be examined in depth today.

The Kidnappers' Deal
Did the Israeli government do everything to return the kidnapped people?
I don't think so. We could have brought more hostages, sooner, at a lower price. This offer from early July that Hamas agreed to is identical to the offer now, only less good in some ways. There are fewer live hostages, unfortunately, more time has passed and we are paying heavier prices here - because there are at least 110 more murderers who will be released in this process.

So who is to blame for it not happening then?
Let's take the event of April, it explains everything. The war cabinet unanimously decides to go for a deal during which they will leave the Netzarim axis, and there are various keys to releasing the kidnapped in exchange for prisoners. In the evening, there is a cabinet discussion, and Finance Minister Smotrich, who does not know or is not supposed to know the plan, enters and says: "There is a plan to return 18 kidnapped in exchange for leaving Netzarim," and declares that he will oppose it and leave the government.

Who told him?
I don't know. I didn't tell him. We told the security establishment - you need to bring 33 hostages, and the minimum number is 18. The number that came out to the media a few hours later was 18. It took a few days for Hamas to understand what the Israeli media was talking about and say I'm backing out of the deal, and in fact this matter fell apart. And it only came back at the end of May through the president's speech.

But Netanyahu will say, if I had stopped at the point where Yoav Galant wanted me to stop, then there would have been no Rafah, Sinwar would not have been eliminated, Nasrallah would not have been eliminated, all this would not have happened.
The only one who pressed for the elimination of Hezbollah and the continuation of the fighting at that time was me. The previous deal was about a 42-day ceasefire and we insisted on that.

Biden, Kirby Blinken and Sullivan say the only one who said 'no' was Hamas
Hamas is to blame, I have no expectations from Hamas. My expectations are only from the Israeli government.

Did the pressure of the demonstrations strengthen Hamas in the negotiations?
I don't think so. Trying to control the procedures that are done within a democracy is impossible.

Do you think that without Trump's pressure we would have reached a deal today?
We went for the same deal that was in July. What changed? Netanyahu considers Trump more than Ben-Gvir, that wasn't true about Biden, that's the whole story.

Let's fast forward to the end of August, when the cabinet points to the Philadelphia axis and you say, "You're killing the hostages." In a chilling way, we already know that the next day the bodies of Uri and Almog and Alex and Hirsch and Carmel and Eden are found.
It was a very, very, very difficult moment. It happened, by all estimates, shortly before or a little after the cabinet discussion, I don't know exactly. God forbid I blame, but it was clear to me that the priority of returning the kidnapped was essential because there were people alive here.

The "Bild" incident, the famous leak that the defense establishment says was intended to thwart a deal. Did the leak itself actually compromise a security source?
The channel that was exposed was a very significant one.

Former Defense Minister Yoav Galant in his first interview (Photo: News 12)
Former Defense Minister Yoav Galant in his first interview | Photo : News 12
The question of "the day after" in the Gaza Strip
Our Israeli tragedy is that there are two war goals. One is to return the hostages, and the other goal is to overthrow the Hamas government, both politically and militarily. These goals come at the expense of each other, not nearly or even remotely. Is Yoav Galant, now that he is the political echelon, preventing the army from completing the mission in the name of this sacred value?
You have to distinguish between two things, and they are really the difference between a military and a political level. The military achieves a decision, but to achieve victory, you need a political act. For a year, I came on January 4th and said, "Build an alternative." The acting prime minister, even though they attacked me, agreed to it. He sent Dermer to the same places I had been before, in the Gulf, in other Arab countries, and in the United States, to market this plan. But we didn't do what was necessary.

So militarily we won the war in Gaza, but politically we lost it?
I think we have defeated Hamas, but we must not invest three divisions now in maintaining military rule in Gaza and fulfilling the dreams of people who have no connection to reality of establishing settlements in the heart of Gaza. The result of this will be disastrous.

The event that changed the picture of the war
July 2024, attention shifts significantly to the north with the killing of children in Majdal Shams.
There is a process here of unfolding a sequence of events that are supposedly independent. I say to the Chief of Staff, "We must eliminate Mohsen" (Hezbollah Chief of Staff). In fact, we make a decision, and it could happen within a day, two days, or a week. And in the meantime, we are already in an "open window" on Haniyeh. That is, we plan on the night of the 30th to eliminate him.

I go to the Mossad, meet the head of the Mossad, and together we do a final briefing for the operations on Haniyeh, for our people in Tehran. In the meantime, a call comes in via the military secretary who tells me, "We now have a catch to eliminate Mohsen." I tell the head of the Mossad and his people, "Good luck, do what is necessary." We eliminate Haniyeh that same day.

There is no hesitation at any point about doing both within such a gap of a few hours?
There are always dilemmas. The Prime Minister, myself, and all the heads of the defense establishment supported this matter.

What killed Haniyeh, a bomb?
yes.

Where was it?
There are things you will have to read in my book. The Americans were not informed about these operations. Shortly afterwards I get a call from then-Defense Secretary Austin. He says to me: "What's going on here?" I told him, "This is a once-in-a-lifetime operation. Would you give it up? Hamas's Tzaza bin Laden."

Operation Pagers
I want to take you to the subject of pagers. Somewhere in the first week of August, we find out that there are people who suspect pagers.

who?
I don't want to go into details, but he appears on the list of those eliminated - because we eliminated him. We made sure to eliminate him with someone else, so that Hezbollah wouldn't understand why we eliminated him. It turned out that somewhere there are beepers being tested. Therefore - either you activate them, or you risk being discovered.

We activate the pager, the success is phenomenal, there are about 2,000, maybe more, terrorists who are injured, but the next day this matter is activated, the issue of radios is activated, and the vast majority of radios explode inside the warehouses.

I mean, we lost a real strategic weapon?
Without choice, it is part of the war process.

On the subject of the beepers, since things are open and the Iranian threat is looming, I simply said a simple thing, there too, I said we can update the Americans. The Prime Minister said: "There is no need to update the Americans." I told him: "Prime Minister, I accept your position, you understand American relations better."

I mean, you didn't object.
I didn't insist, I didn't insist on pagers, I said I thought it would be desirable.

The attack on the pagers in Lebanon (Photo: AP)
Riots in Lebanon during Operation Beeper | Photo : AP
The elimination of Hezbollah's top brass - and Nasrallah
On the 20th of the month, September 20, at noon, the head of the IDF's Operations Division, Major General Biyuk, came to me and said, "Look, we have the entire top brass of Radwan and Akil, the head of the Operations Division, in one place." We entered into a conversation that took about two or three hours, and the decision was made to carry out the operation. The top brass of Radwan's force's operations division was eliminated. These were the people who planned the raid into Israeli territory.

And when they respond on Saturday night, we fall on them on Sunday with the attack, Monday morning, and in 15 hours we eliminate Hezbollah's missile and rocket array. Today was the most intense day of fighting in the north since the beginning of the campaign. In one day, the Air Force hit more than a thousand targets across Lebanon.

Hezbollah has about 5,500 long-range missiles that can reach the center, they are left with hundreds after this attack. Hezbollah has 44,000 missiles at the start of the war, they are left with less than 10,000. This is what is happening on this day, and it is a very significant day.

Let's talk about eliminating Nasrallah
The execution is on Friday, on the Sunday before that the Chief of Staff, the Air Force Commander and others come to me, present the operation to eliminate Nasrallah, where he is and so on. And I say to them, "What are the chances of success?" And the answer I get, "90 percent." I asked them, "How many tons of explosives are you going to drop on him?" They tell me, "40 tons." I say, "Go for the 80-ton alternative, double the amount of explosives "so that we reach 99 percent."

On Wednesday, two days before the liquidation, a cabinet meeting is held, the Chief of Staff presents the manner in which we are going to liquidate. It turns out that the cabinet has a majority of five, with two against. I tell the Prime Minister, "Bring this to a vote." The Prime Minister pauses the discussion, asks me, the Chief of Staff, a few more IDF and military officials to enter the room. The head of Military Intelligence says, "There's a chance he'll leave in the near future," "It could take a few hours, it's worth deciding."

The prime minister returns to the room and says: "We are not ready to make a decision, I will return from the United States on Sunday and we will make the decision." In effect, he leaves the country, travels to the United States while Nasrallah is underground, and there is a certain chance that he will leave. The next morning, an agreement between Israel and the United States is published in the Israeli and international media, and the agreement talks about a ceasefire. Within a short time, ministers in the Israeli government come out and say we do not agree to this agreement.

Smotrich and Ben Gvir
Regardless, or with a connection, shortly after that I receive a phone call from the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff, "I was thinking about what you said last night." A cabinet discussion convenes for certification at night. A conversation that takes several hours and ends with certification.

On Friday morning, the Chief of Staff and I sit together, set 6:00 PM as the final time. So, we pick up the phone together to the Prime Minister, and he says "I'm happy," and adds: "I'd like to postpone until 6:30 because at 6 I'll be on the UN stage." We compromise on 6:20. 84 tons of bombs are dropped on all the places we mentioned - and Nasrallah passes away.

The description I hear from the other side is exactly the opposite, saying that the top brass of the army didn't want it, that the Minister of Defense didn't want it, and that in the end Netanyahu was the one who said to eliminate
I suggest opening the protocol. The facts are that the Prime Minister is leaving the State of Israel while Nasrallah is in the bunker, potentially leaving his position.

The assassination of Nasrallah (Photo: AFP)
The place where Hassan Nasrallah was assassinated | Photo : AFP
The Iranian issue
Is now the time to attack the nuclear facilities?
In '25, there is no goalkeeper in the Iranian goal, now you have to decide whether to kick or not to kick.

But the question is not that, the question is whether we have the ability from the end of the field to kick and score?
Israel has the capabilities to inflict very significant damage on Iranian nuclear facilities.

The arrest warrants from The Hague
On November 21, the International Criminal Court announces that an arrest warrant has been issued for you and the Prime Minister for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. The question is, could anything have been done differently?
I directed the IDF and I wasn't the only one, neither was the Prime Minister. We act according to international law and in this regard, we did not attack illegal targets, certainly not intentionally, and if mistakes were made, mistakes may have been made, but one thing needs to be clear: who Hamas is.

Are you looking for the headquarters? Go to the hospital. Are you looking for the ammunition depot? Go to the school. We are a moral army, I am proud of the IDF soldiers.

Removal from office - and the draft exemption law
You are called to the Prime Minister, this time November 5, 2012. He hands you the letter, how does it go?
It was a very short act, he gave me the letter, I took it and went outside.

And then you decided to resign from the Knesset, because in the end this decision is not really entirely moral. If you are in favor, and you are in favor of conscription for everyone and equality of burden, and we need to move on this issue, you left the campaign in the middle and vacated the seat for someone who will indeed make this possible.
When there is a majority of 16 it doesn't matter what your finger does as an individual.

But you left so they wouldn't announce that you were a retiring MK.
No, if I had decided I wanted to stay, I wouldn't have issued the 7,000 draft orders. Believe me, I wouldn't have been fired.

The issue of the Haredi mobilization is a clear example of how the Likud faction is deviating from its path. And I'll tell you more than that, there are a lot of "Norwegians" in this Knesset who think they will flank Ben-Gvir from the right, the Likud are the successors of Begin, not Ben-Gvir.

In general, I look at the norm in which elected officials, unfortunately not only members of Knesset, but also ministers, attack the Chief of Staff and the head of the Shin Bet. In a historical flow, the Likud must continue to lead and the State of Israel needs the Likud and we will fix things.

Former Defense Minister Yoav Galant in his first interview (Photo: News 12)
Former Defense Minister Yoav Galant in his first interview | Photo : News 12
Are you continuing in Likud?
Of course.

Will you vote for Likud led by Benjamin Netanyahu?
I will vote for any Likud party whose voters put someone in charge.

Can you continue to be a senior figure in Israeli public life with this stain of October 7?
The public will determine this, and preferably after hearing from a state investigation committee that says who is responsible and why.

Former Defense Minister Yoav Galant, thank you very much for speaking with us.
Thank you.

[yfr bachur]

We clearly are going to heavy disagree as to what counts as "forced."

But leaving that aside, why wouldn't you say this decision was also "forced by pressure"? The US was heavily pressuring Israel not to do it. So maybe it also "went against ALL known facts and risk assessments."

The shalit deal pressure was the pressure from the public relations campaign of the shalit family, which caused Israeli public opinion to shift to pressure to make a deal. Nothing involved had anything to do with assessments of possible damage to the countries security. Not dissimilar from the Women in Green that caused the withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

Totally different from pressure from a foreign country that happens to be the greatest support of the countries defense. That becomes part of  risk assessments.

Agav, the assumption that if the US wouldn't sell arms to IL, they would just make their own is faulty. A. It assumes that they would still be able to buy the raw materials. B. There are certain armaments that they would not be able to produce, period.

[yawn]

America did not approve any of the actions against Hezbollah even after those kids were killed.
Israel was not provoking anything on Oct 11 or any other time in the war. Hezbollah had started the missiles on Oct 8th, completely unprovoked. *That* "broadened the conflict".

The fact that Israel shamefully displaced tends of thousands of citizens for months on end and only decided to finally attack because they'd lose their beeper attack is not proof of careful military strategy to protect its citizens but a disgraceful display of how appeasement leads to discarding the lives of "unimportant" citizens to protect the political power of the elites.

The beeper attack was use it or lose it, but followed weeks of targeted high level strikes following Majdal Shams. At that point they were already at war,

Your assertion that this was about protecting political power is completely distorting everything I've been saying.I've been very clear that political decisions mean decisions made by politicians, which factor future security concerns. On 10/11, Netanyahus political life was seemingly over, and if he was focused on preserving it, he would've greenlit this attack.

ETA: Unless you mean you previous argument that he was against this because he was afraid of/hated Gallant, which sounds incredibly far fetched, but OK.